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f you build it, he will come  
  W. P. Kinsella (Shoeless Joe, Houghton Mifflin, 1982) 
 Concerns over bioterrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and food safety and 
security led to the creation of a regional network of biosafety level 3 facilities in the 
United States. These facilities provide safe environments for conducting research on 
high consequence bacterial and viral pathogens. The facilities were expensive to build 
and will be expensive to operate. They do, however, provide unique opportunities for 
researchers throughout the country to conduct research programs that are not 
possible without the specialized containment laboratories. To be economically viable, 
the biocontainment labs must be maximally utilized. This necessitates that 
Universities that host these facilities create an environment that encourages and 
facilitates collaborative and cooperative research agreements with regional research 
institutions. 
 
Introduction 
 Contemporary scientific research 
often involves the use of expensive 
equipment and facilities. When 
universities make a commitment to 
provide these facilities, the decision not 
only involves an up-front expenditure of 
often scarce resources, but 
programmatically commits the 
university to very specific research 
directions. Prior to having the 
specialized facilities, it is unlikely that a 
critical mass of faculty will exist who 
work in that research arena, because of 
the very lack of those facilities. The 
newly constructed facilities, or 
expensive equipment, thus become the 
“Field of Dreams” with the expectation 
that researchers who can exploit the 
resources will be identified. Some may 
be recruited to the University, other 
users as collaborators or users of the 
facilities on a fee-for-service basis.  
 This model has been quite 
successfully applied in certain scientific 
disciplines, most notably physics, where 
the costs of particle colliders, cyclotrons, 
and nuclear reactors are beyond the 
scope of most university budgets. 
Physicists at Universities lacking these 
facilities book time on these instruments 
and then spend the bulk of the year 
analyzing the data back at their home 
institution. Biologists, as a general rule, 
tend not to think regionally when it 
comes to their individual research 
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programs. For example, Midwestern 
schools lack research programs in 
marine biology, despite being ideally 
situated equidistant from the Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans. We do not seek out 
time-sharing options with institutions 
which have the ships and equipment to 
conduct this type of research (i.e. Scripts 
and Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institutions). Modern research in 
molecular biology is increasingly 
dependent on the use of expensive 
equipment and specialized facilities. 
Will biologists follow the lead of our 
physicist colleagues and make use of 
regional or national resources? This will 
soon be put to the test with the 
construction of the national network of 
Regional Biocontainment Laboratories.  
The RBL Network 
 The anthrax postal (Amerithrax) 
bioterrorism events in the fall of 2001 
raised bioterror concerns in the US and 
worldwide1. In February 2002, 
consultations between the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) and its Blue Ribbon 
Panel on Bioterrorism produced several 
recommendations for NIAID to better 
protect the American public from the 
threat of bioterrorism. One 
recommendation was to create more 
laboratory space for work with 
dangerous pathogens. A request for 
proposals was issued to create a regional 
network of biosafety level 3 laboratories 
(Regional Biocontainment Laboratories 
[RBLs]) and biosafety level 4 facilities 
(National Biocontainment Laboratories 
[NBLs]2. Two NBLs were ultimately 
created, one in Boston, MA and the other 
in Galveston, TX. Thirteen RBLs were 
created in this program (Figure 1). NIH 
provided 75% of the construction costs 
for the RBLs and the remainder of the 
construction costs was provided by the 
host institution or state. The grantees in 
turn agreed to operate the 
biocontainment labs for a period of 
twenty years. The two NBLs, with the 
highest level of biocontainment (BSL-4), 
receive operation support through the 
NIH awards and are facilities that can 
handle exceedingly dangerous 
pathogens for which there is no vaccine 
or therapy available. The RBLs, are BSL-
3 facilities which are designed for work 
on pathogens that are transmitted by the 
aerosol route, have significant mortality 
rates, but for which vaccines or 
treatments are available. The NIH 
provided construction costs for the 
RBLs, but made it clear that operating 
costs for them was not to be part of this 
program. The Biosecurity Research 
Institute (BRI) at Kansas State University 
was not part of the NIH program, but is 
included in this discussion because of its 
unique attributes relative to the other 
containment facilities.  
Microbial pathogens that are of 
concern as agents of bioterrorism, are 
part of the federal government’s Select 
Agent program, and research on these 
agents require BSL-3 containment 
facilities3. The select agent pathogens 
include a variety of bacterial, viral 
pathogens that share the property of 
being transmissible by the aerosol route. 
Examples include the agent of anthrax 
(Bacillus anthracis), plague (Yersinia 
pestis), tularemia (Francisella tularensis), 
and St. Louis Encephalitis Virus. Prior to 
2001, research on virulent strains of B.  
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BSL-3 Facility Location Approximate Gross 
Square Footage 
Estimated Cost 
Colorado State University RBL Ft. Collins, CO 33,850 $30 million 
George Mason University 
Biomedical Research Laboratory 
Fairfax, VA 53,000 $48 million 
Howard T. Ricketts RBL 
(University of Chicago) 
Chicago, IL 35,000 $31 million 
Kansas State University 
Biosecurity Research Institute 
Manhattan, KS 113,000 $54 million 
New England Regional Biosafety  
Laboratory (Tufts University) 
Boston, MA 41,000 $33.7 million 
Pacific RBL 
University of Hawaii 
Honolulu, HI 25,000 $47.5 million 
RBL at Duke University Durham, NC 33,145 $22.4 million 
Southeast Biosafety Laboratory 
(Univ. Alabama at Birmingham) 
Birmingham, AL 43,500 $32 million 
Tulane University RBL Covington, LA 38,000 $27.5 million 
University of Medicine & Dentistry 
Of New Jersey RBL 
Newark, NJ 34,700 $39 million 
University of Louisville Center for 
Preventive Medicine 
Louisville, KY 37,000 $34.6 million 
University of Missouri Columbia, MO 32,500 $18.5 million 
University of Pittsburgh RBL Pittsburgh, PA 20,000 $28.8 million 
University of Tennessee Health 
Science Center RBL 
Memphis, TN 30,315 $25 million 
anthracis could be conducted at the 
lower biocontainment level, BSL-2, 
which is more typical of the level of 
typical University medical microbiology 
laboratories. However, with inclusion of 
B. anthracis on the select agent list, 
research on this pathogen requires the 
more specialized and expensive BSL-3 
containment. Thus reclassification of 
biosafety conditions, in addition to an 
increased emphasis on biodefense-
related research, created the increased 
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demand for biocontainment research 
laboratories. 
 The RBLs support NIAID-funded 
biodefense and emerging infectious 
diseases research and are members of 
the NIAID Biodefense Network. 
Additionally, the RBLs serve as regional 
resources for research institutions in the 
area, and would be available and 
prepared to assist national, state, and 
local public health efforts in the event of 
a bioterrorism emergency. At the same 
time as the RBL construction grant 
program, NIAID held a competition to 
establish a network of Regional Centers 
of Excellence for Research in Biodefense 
and Emerging Infectious Diseases 
(RCEs)4. Although the RBL construction 
grant program was distinct form the 
RCE program, the RBLs have in many 
cases formed an alliance with the RCEs 
and provide an important source of 
biocontainment research space for the 
RCE research projects. 
The RBLs are intended to be 
regional resources, although the 
majority of them are concentrated in the 
eastern half of the United States. The 
Universities hosting the RBLs fall into a 
spectrum of experience in research 
programs related to high containment 
pathogens. At one end of the spectrum 
was Colorado State University, which 
had large established biosafety level 3 
programs in tuberculosis and arthropod-
borne viruses. Construction of the RBL 
permitted them to expand their heavily 
utilized facilities and further build these 
research programs. The existing 
programs at Colorado State meant that 
at the time of the RBL construction, 
investigators and projects going into the 
new space were already largely 
identified.  
At the other end of the spectrum 
were Kansas State University, the 
University of Louisville and the 
University of Missouri that at the time of 
the awarding of the RBL grants, had 
either no biosafety level 3 laboratory 
space or had small individual 
laboratories. Existing faculty with need 
for these facilities were not present at 
these universities at the time of the RBL 
grant submissions or were present in too 
small a number to utilized the newly 
constructed research space. Without the 
specialized facilities, no existing projects 
were in place in these institutions. Thus 
the RBLs were built with the intention 
that biocontainment-requiring programs 
would have to be established de novo.  
 The Kansas State University 
Biosecurity Research Institute is unique 
among the biocontainment laboratories 
in that it is a BSL-3Ag facility, 
specifically designed to permit research 
on larger animals, specifically food 
animals. It is the only facility listed 
above which can study zoonotic 
infections involving cattle, sheep, goats, 
and swine. It is a remarkable facility that 
can contribute substantially to our 
understanding of zoonotic diseases and 
food safety. Although Kansas State had 
strong research programs in food safety 
and security, at the time the University 
completed construction of the BRI, it had 
no active BSL-3 or BSL-3Ag research 
programs. However, the facility has 
already paid dividends for the 
University as the presence of the BRI has 
been cited as one factor in the selection 
of the Manhattan, KS site for the 
Department of Homeland Security’s 
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National Agro- and Biodefense Facility 
(NBAF), a biosafety level 3 and 4 facility 
for research on foreign animal diseases 
and zoonoses to replace the aging Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center. 
Construction of NBAF will create a 
500,000 sq ft. facility dedicated to the 
study of zoonotic and foreign animal 
diseases and will provide an influx of 
infectious disease expertise to the 
Midwest. However, Kansas State, like 
the other Universities hosting RBLs, 
must internally build up its research 
programs in infectious diseases to make 
optimal use of their new facilities. 
Challenges to internally building 
biocontainment research programs  
 Biocontainment facilities are 
expensive to build, especially with the 
requirement for redundant safety 
features. They are additionally 
expensive to operate. Their energy costs 
are greater than conventional laboratory 
buildings. They require a special work 
force of highly trained individuals to 
provide for the increased security and 
maintenance aspects of the building. The 
need for a larger and more highly 
trained work force for biocontainment 
facilities drives up personnel costs. 
Many of these expenses are fixed, and 
thus operating the facility at 50% 
capacity is not significantly less 
expensive than operating it at full 
capacity. Thus the only way that these 
facilities will not be an economic drain 
on the Universities is to have them 
operating at capacity and the research 
projects bringing in revenue in the form 
of grants and contracts to the host 
institutions. It is critical that 
Universities, once they commit to 
operating biocontainment facilities, 
recruit faculty specifically to the 
facilities. These faculty could be 
recruited to different departments at the 
University (such as Biology, 
Biochemistry, Microbiology, etc). 
However, usually it is a specific group 
or department that was the driving force 
in the development of the proposal for 
the RBL, and other departments did not 
necessarily buy in to this specific 
research direction for the University. 
Because of chronically tight budgets, 
new faculty hires are limited at the 
Universities. Many departments opt not 
to recruit with the RBL in mind. This 
may be due to specific programmatic or 
teaching needs for the individual 
department. Another potential concern, 
however, is economic. With universities 
committed to operating the RBLs or the 
BRI, funding sources to operate these 
facilities will have to come from overly 
stretched budgets. Adding a faculty 
member who utilizes the facility might 
target that department for providing 
funds for operational costs. At least that 
is the fear shared by heads of the 
departments. As a consequence, for 
many of the RBLs and the BRI, very few 
faculty researchers have actually been 
recruited to staff the biocontainment 
laboratories and to write grants to 
support operation of the facilities. Most 
of these facilities will be markedly 
under-utilized at the time they acquire 
the requisite certifications to begin BSL-3 
and Select Agent Program operations.  
 The addition of faculty after the 
facilities become operational, improves 
the situation but takes time before the 
newly hired researchers can contribute. 
The faculty, and whatever postdoctoral, 
student, and technical staff they hire, 
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must undergo Department of Justice 
background checks and extensive 
training before they can begin working 
under biosafety level 3 conditions. 
Research projects must be approved by 
University Compliance committees (the 
Institutional Biosafety Committee [IBC] 
and the Animal Care and Use 
Committee [ACUC]) as well as obtaining 
CDC or USDA authorization for select 
agent-related activities. These are time-
consuming processes that can delay the 
initiation of research projects by many 
months. Only after all of the compliance 
approvals are in place and all of the 
biosafety and agent-specific training 
have been conducted, will the research 
projects be initiated. Only then can the 
preliminary data be generated to 
support research grant applications to 
federal agencies. The development of a 
funding stream to the RBL based on 
research grants is a very slow and 
laborious process.  
Putting the “regional” in regional 
biocontainment laboratories 
 Construction of the BRI is 
finished and that of the RBLs is largely 
accomplished (although many have not 
yet initiated operations until the 
appropriate federals approvals [i.e. CDC 
Select Agent]) are in place. It is obvious 
that as these facilities begin operations, 
space will be available for researchers 
outside the host university to conduct 
infectious disease research. University 
researchers, as well as those in the 
private sector, will have opportunities to 
conduct research or evaluate 
therapeutics or vaccines that would be 
either impossible in their home 
institutions owing to a lack of 
biocontainment space or difficulties in 
scheduling space in over-subscribed 
small individual biocontainment labs. 
One path for this activity would be to 
establish a formal collaboration with a 
faculty member at the RBL host 
institution. The limited number of 
biocontainment-related investigators 
initially at the RBL host institution, 
however, limits this approach. A more 
fruitful initial approach would be for the 
RBL host institutions to contract out the 
use of its biocontainment facilities and 
technical expertise to regional 
universities and biotech or 
pharmaceutical companies. The RBL 
would not only provide the facilities and 
specialized equipment necessary to 
conduct the studies, but would provide 
a trained technical staff as well. The 
advantages to this approach to the 
outside investigator would be not 
having to provide the federal regulatory 
clearances for lab workers, not having to 
train lab personnel in techniques which 
may not be totally familiar to the 
investigator, and not having to secure 
housing for the researchers during the 
duration of the experiments.  
 The biocontainment facility host 
institutions will have to develop 
business plans to facilitate these contract 
services. Fee for service rates would 
have to be established. Marketing 
approaches would have to be 
established and web sites developed to 
effectively inform researchers from both 
academic institutions and the private 
sector about the capabilities of the 
biocontainment facility and the types of 
expertise resident in the facility. 
Development of effective business and 
marketing strategies is beyond the 
expertise of the scientists conducting 
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infectious disease research, so it is 
imperative that the Universities mobilize 
the requisite expertise from other sectors 
of the university. It is also important that 
university officials of the RBL host 
institution maintain open lines of 
communication with the other regional 
research universities so that when 
opportunities for research interactions 
arise, the institutions involved will be 
able to respond quickly to these.  
Impediments to regional 
cooperation  
Time is the biggest concern when 
establishing cooperative research 
agreements involving biocontainment 
facilities. Once an agreement between 
institutions is reached, a long list of 
approvals at both the federal and local 
levels is required. If select agent 
organisms are involved, approval by the 
CDC and/or the USDA is required. The 
RBL would have to gain approval for 
working with the specific agent, if 
approval for that particular organism is 
not in place. Agent-specific standard 
operating procedures would have to be 
developed and agent-specific training of 
the RBL personnel instituted. At the host 
university level, project applications to 
the research compliance committees, the 
IBC and ACUC committees. Getting 
proposals approved by these federal and 
university committees can take months 
to achieve. University research 
compliance committees will be placed in 
a relatively unique position of 
evaluating proposals for projects 
originating from outside the university. 
University Research Offices will have to 
develop policies to effectively handle 
these occurrences. The establishment of 
inter-university agreements whereby the 
institutions would accept the compliance 
approvals from the other university 
would greatly streamline this approval 
process. Institutions lacking containment 
facilities may not have the requisite 
biosafety expertise on their research 
compliance committees. In these cases, a 
full review by the RBL host university 
would be necessary.  
 Another issue which could slow 
down the agreement process, especially 
when dealing with private sector 
companies, is the handling of intellectual 
property issues. This is especially 
important when research involving 
potential therapeutic agents or vaccines 
is conducted. Again it is imperative that 
the RBL host university have in place 
personnel and procedures to act on these 
issues in a timely manner.  
Summary 
 The RBL network can become a 
major resource to universities and 
provide the necessary research 
environment to advance our knowledge 
of biothreat and emerging infectious 
disease agents. With the large number of 
diseases arising naturally in the past 
twenty years (Mother Nature being the 
ultimate bioterrorist), these facilities will 
play a vital role in protecting American 
public health in the years to come. 
However, to effectively utilize these 
facilities, researchers must learn to 
establish research ties with these 
specialized facilities and the RBL host 
university must establish effective lines 
of communication with regional 
universities and private sector 
companies to facilitate cooperative 
research agreements. Regional 
biocontainment laboratories should be 
truly regional and universities must 
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learn to be less territorial in dealing with 
their sister institutions. The 
biocontainment facilities should be a 
source of new opportunities and if 
managed correctly, not a fiscal drain on 
the host university.  
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